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ARTICLE
Sport, games, and the fluidity of agency
Jon Pike
Philosophy, Open University, Milton Keynes, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland
KEYWORDS Sport; agency; art; embodiment; difficulty
Thi Nguyen has given us a cracker of a book in Games: Agency as Art (Nguyen 
2020), one that sports philosophers amongst others will learn from for many 
years. One fascinating (but I will argue, problematic) aspect of the work is that 
his theory of the fluidity of agency and his analysis of games as ‘the art of 
agency’ appears to cover both sport (embodied games) games and board 
games, computer games and so on (that is, non-embodied games), and gives 
broadly the same account of different types of games:
We can find the aesthetics of agency in virtually any game. It is not confined to 
narrative, cinematic videogames, or politically serious game design, it is a kind 
of aesthetic experience common to sports, video games, board games, role 
playing games, card games and more (Nguyen 2020, 104).
This is a grand claim. It follows in (at least one path of) the Suitsian 
tradition, in that, at least sometimes, Bernard Suits thought that sports were 
games (Suits 2005) but see (Suits 1988) and (Berman 2019). I think, though, 
that there are problems in the generality of this approach that I will outline 
with particular reference to his discussion in the section ‘towards an aes-
thetics of agency’ in Chapter 5. I draw also on less formal remarks online 
made by Nguyen in discussion of his work on Pea Soup which deflate the 
distinction between embodied and non-embodied action.1 Nguyen outlines 
an account of the aesthetic value of agency in which he makes points that 
apply both to embodied and non-embodied games. He also seeks to sub-
stitute an ‘aesthetics of agency’ account for an account of games as ‘fic-
tions’. My case is that something gets lost in translation about the value of 
different sorts of games. Rather, what I will call the modality of agency: what 
is necessary, what is possible, varies, in normatively significant ways, across 
these boundaries.
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I
Nguyen moves from embodied to non-embodied games seamlessly. This is 
clear on a number of occasions, but obvious when he moves in chapter five 
from the ‘harmony of solution’ to the ‘harmony of action’:
in a beautiful Chess move, there is a harmony between the move and the 
situation it addresses here is a trap, there is an elegant resolution. Call this the 
harmony of solution. The harmony of solution is strictly a harmony between the 
solution and the obstacle. It makes no explicit reference to the actor or their 
capacities. The harmony of the solution is available to both spectator and player 
(Nguyen 2020, 108).
In contrast:
. . . there is another form of harmony which includes the player's agency. Let’s 
call this the harmony of action. When you time a jump just so in Super Mario 
Brothers; or when you figure out, during a rock climb that you need to slide your 
hips over just enough to balance on that tiny nubbin of rock, you’re experien-
cing more than the harmony of solution. You’re experiencing your agency and 
action in fitting the demands of the environment. You experienced not only the 
fit between the obstacle and the solution but the fit between the obstacle and 
yourself as the originator of those solutions (Nguyen 2020, 108).
However (as I understand things) to jump in Super Mario Brothers is not to 
jump in our ordinary understanding of the words: it is to flick a plastic hand 
held device up a couple of centimetres at exactly the right time. Equally, the 
game could be reconfigured so that timing a jump was a matter of hitting a 
button at exactly the right time. The action of a well timed jump in Super 
Mario Brothers could be multiply realised. Cntrast, the way in which Nguyen 
slides his hips over, just enough to balance on that tiny nubbin of rock.
Why does this difference matter? I think it matters because of the particu-
larity of the capacity that is at play in rock climbing. As Nguyen later puts ‘I 
choose and decide just the right movements for the task’. But when flicking up 
his handset Nguyen is not choosing or deciding which is the right movement 
for the task in quite the same way, because the decision whether the right 
movement is to flick the handset or hit a button has already been made by the 
game designer, not by the gamer. Perhaps there is a simple sense in which it’s 
possible to stop the game, reconfigure the handset, and change the jump 
function from a flick to a button press. But this highlights rather than effaces the 
distinction I want to make. First, reconfiguring handsets takes place outside of 
the game. Second, there is no analogue of this reconfiguration for rock climb-
ing because the actions required: shifting one's hips, tensing one's arm muscles, 
and so on, are not multiply realisable if one is to get up this particular climb. Of 
course, there are different ways up a particular route, but the ways are finite, the 
moves are finite, and these either fit with our finite capacities and our embo-
died nature, or they don’t. And note too, that if we reconfigure Super Mario 
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Brothers so that we hit a button, rather than flick a handset, we are still 
recognisably and essentially playing Super Mario Brothers, but if we are hauled 
up the cliff by a winch, then we are no longer rock climbing.
This brings us to Nguyen’s account of the harmony of capacity. Here, the 
sense that something is lost in the over-general approach to embodied and 
non-embodied games is perhaps strongest. Nguyen identifies a sense that 
‘one’s total capacities fit precisely with the demands of the world’ and calls 
this the ‘harmony of capacity’ (109): the contrast with the harmony of action is 
that the former unlike the latter makes ‘no reference to how difficult that 
action is compared with the actor's total capacities’, and this seems impor-
tant. If, as Gwen Bradford (Bradford 2015) argues, difficulty is an essential part 
of achievement then the harmony of capacity looks like a component of both 
the aesthetic value and the achievement value of embodied games: difficulty 
is a big deal. But all I need to show is that there is an aesthetic and/or morally 
relevant distinction between embodied difficulty and non-embodied difficulty 
to show that Nguyen’s claim is over-general, occluding the differences 
between different modes of agency.
In the process, Nguyen makes an empirical claim that fails to match up to 
competitive sport. He says:
the harmony of capacity is far rarer than the harmony of action. The harmony of 
action occurs frequently in my everyday life... But the experience of that most 
delicious of harmonies - the harmony of capacity - is particularly rare in the wild 
(Nguyen 2020, 111).
He goes on to say:
but in games the obstacles can be engineered to fit us. Some of this is the work 
of the game designer. Some of it is the players finding the right level, or the 
appropriate opponents, or even just fiddling with the difficulty level. But in our 
life with games, we design fiddle and pick until the struggle is tailored just right 
(Nguyen 2020, 111-112).
But this seems to put the emphasis in the wrong place. There are mechan-
isms within competitive sport and beyond the scope of the game designer 
that secure the right level of difficulty to make highly likely the harmony of 
capacity – knockout competitions, for example, tend to ensure that the 
struggle is just right. That’s to say Nguyen underestimates the way in which 
competition itself generates the appropriate level of difficulty such that our 
capacities and the tasks come into harmony. So it’s critical to recognise the 
nature of the real and physical constraints that determine what counts as 
excellent action and determine and funnel the actions of the active compe-
titive athlete towards the harmony of capacity.
Something of the contrast I have in mind here emerges in Nguyen’s 
discussion of QWOP, a computer game that takes the form of a sprinting 
simulator where the controls direct the left and right thigh and the left and 
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right calf of the avatar. As he puts it ‘when one finally manages to make the 
thing run, it is, for a while at least, a constant fight against one’s intuitions and 
instincts. (It is a fairly significant victory to make the ragdoll run for over 
2 seconds)’ (Nguyen 2020, 112). At this point in the argument it is worth 
readers taking two minutes away from my paper to try to play QWOP.
Now, it might be expected that an old school response to this would be 
‘why make the action running more difficult than it need be, when what is 
valuable about the action of running is the ability and practise required to run 
faster given all our embodied capacities?’ What is the point of this game? 
Perhaps this looks like a stupid game. But I don’t want to make that criticism. I 
can see why if we limit ourselves to non-embodied actions, cognitive abilities 
and multiply realisable moves, there is no real point in objecting to an 
artificially difficult puzzle. So I have no problem with QWOP, as an entertain-
ing and frustrating exercise.
But what would be the embodied equivalent of QWOP? It would be 
something like a three-legged race where participant runners are tied 
together by one leg and required to get down the course as fast as possible. 
Such an action requires coordination, synchronisation, counter-intuitive 
adjustment in a similar way to QWOP, in particular, it requires the disaggre-
gation and reconstitution of basic actions. But there are reasons – good 
reasons – why the three-legged race is not part of the Olympic programme 
and the 100 metres Sprint is. These reasons apply only to embodied sport. In 
what follows I will spell out those reasons and thereby hope to shed some 
light on my critique of Nguyen’s attempt to locate the value of embodied 
games in this overly general way.
II
When thinking about the biophysical side of sport, it is sometimes necessary to 
stop and stare. A common thought is that non-physical, complex and difficult 
games such as chess and Go show us the human mind at work at a very high 
level. But Deep Blue, a computer programme developed by IBM cracked chess 
in 1997 when it beat Gary Kasparov in New York City (Hsu 2002). This left the 
field open to Go, but in 2015, Lee Sedol, an 18-time world champion was 
defeated by AlphaGo, a programme developed by Google in Seoul, South 
Korea. We should stop and stare though, not at these cases but at the 
Robocup, widely available on YouTube:
This annual soccer tournament matches teams consisting of the most techno-
logically advance robots on Earth. The robots shuffle around the field, slowly. 
The occasionally bump into each other, causing one or both to fall down. 
Whereas a human soccer player moves smoothly towards a ball never breaking 
stride as she controls it with her foot until lofting a pass to a player downfield. 
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The robots encounter with the ball is anything but fluid . . . the kick when it 
finally comes, sends the ball rolling a few feet, typically in a random direction . . . 
(Cappuccio et al. 2018, 3).
The fact that physical abilities are much harder to replicate than chess- 
playing abilities follows from the fact that they are different kinds of abilities. 
The incompetence of the robots playing football suggest that this is not a 
good game for them. It is doubtful whether the existence of a ball affords 
kicking to a robot, because the robot is unable to kick in a directional manner. 
In the absence of these affordances, the existences of football rules do not 
conjure up the ability to play football, for robots.
I have, elsewhere, endorsed Chemero’s formula Affords-φ (feature, ability). 
It is a necessary condition for Affords-φ that the agent has the ability to do 
something – the ability to φ. Abilities are closely tied to affordances – the 
agent/world relation presents us with affordances in accordance with our 
abilities, which is to say that, if we are unable to φ in situation S then the 
affordance φ-ing does not exist in S, or, S does not afford φ.
One reason that abilities are important is that they might seem to be a 
source of value. There are several candidate accounts of the normative role of 
abilities. For Nguyen, part of this value lies in the harmony of capacity in which 
the outer edge of our abilities matches up to the affordance. Bradford argues, 
similarly, that the value of achievements rests on them being competently 
caused. In both cases, difficulty is an essential component, and for both, 
competence in doing something difficult will be essential.
But note how Bradford cashes this out. For her, ‘competent causation is a 
matter of having a certain amount of justified true beliefs about the nature of 
one’s activities. The requisite amount of JTBs is a percentage of the possible 
relevant beliefs’ (Bradford 2015, 143).
From this argument Bradford gets the conclusion that ‘doing philosophy is 
typically more valuable than doing sports’ (Bradford 2015, 151). This is 
primarily because ‘the number and quality of the JTBs that we entertain in 
philosophy are both very high, meaning that the structure of the kinds of 
things that we aim to figure out in philosophy have a very high level of 
explanatory power, and so it is very valuable to think about them’ (Bradford 
2015, 151; emphasis my own). In this account she draws on Hurka (1996, 112). 
Competent causation, for Bradford, is cashed out in terms of JTBs. Nguyen 
doesn’t make this claim, but the generality of his claim about embodied and 
non-embodied games suggests that they share the same characteristic sort of 
value.
I want to resist this conclusion, not by arguing that doing sports is 
typically more valuable than doing philosophy, but by showing that the 
source of value in the two cases is different. The JTB approach is mistaken, 
because the actions involved in sports standardly do not involve 
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propositional knowledge-that, but embodied, non-propositional, cognition: 
know-how. If the sort of cognition involved in sport is non-propositional, 
then an approach to comparative valuation of sport and philosophy that 
involves counting up propositions (and JTBs are propositions) will turn out 
to be misleading. We need to be able to explain the difference between 
Deep Blue and AlphaGo on the one hand and Robocup on the other, or, to 
put it another way, between the 100m sprint at the Olympics, and QWOP. 
Both are difficult, but in different ways. One way to understand this is to 
look at embodied abilities.
It is customary in the literature to distinguish different kinds of ability, and I 
will follow this practice. So, we can distinguish first General Ability: having the 
motor skills, competency, and know how to ride a bike. But I can have these 
without having access to a bike. Following Vihvelin (2013) we can distinguish 
Narrow (or Specific) Ability. In order to have this, we need also the psycho-
logical and physical capacity – having consumed a bottle of vodka would 
mean I can’t ride a bike, even though I have the general ability. I will not have 
the specific ability to ride a bike now: I don’t have what it takes. Sport will 
tend to measure narrow abilities as a surrogate for general abilities. But there 
seems to be an embedded deference to general abilities in our approach to 
sport. At least, when we think that an athlete has a general ability but lacks 
the narrow ability, for reasons that are not their fault, then we tend to look for 
new ways in which we can test for the general ability. Perhaps we are 
interested in general abilities, and ought to measure them by means of 
narrow abilities – on the basis that everyone who has what it takes ought 
to be able to compete.
This seems to be the basis for the Makwala case. The Botswanan sprinter 
Isaac Makwala was not allowed to compete in the heats for the 200 m at the 
world championship in 2017, because he was in 48-hour quarantine because 
of suspected norovirus infection. However, he was allowed to run an indivi-
dual time trial, at which he was able to qualify for the final. One way of 
explaining the thought behind this is that sports test narrow abilities as a way 
of getting at general abilities, and that when they prove to be a bad way at 
getting at general abilities, it is fair to try to remedy that situation.
Thirdly, wide ability is narrow ability plus access and opportunity. So, wide 
ability includes i) the skill, competence, (having the general ability) ii) having 
the access (i.e. having the narrow ability – something that Makwala lacked 
since he was banned from competing in the heats.) iii) having the opportunity 
(or having the wide ability). The case for egalitarianism in the distribution of 
sporting resources rests on the claim that the gap between wide abilities and 
general abilities ought to be closed. That is, it rests on the idea that we ought 
to try to get at general abilities, rather than just testing the abilities of those 
who are adequately resourced.
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Finally, for the sake of completion, an important category for our analysis is 
Simple Ability: the ability to do something by luck: a kind of specific ability 
that doesn’t require the ability to do something intentionally. Having the 
simple ability to do something like hit the bullseye or throw a six is not so 
interesting to sport, insofar as sport is a matter of excellent abilities, but it is a 
part of the interest in sport as a spectacle – this is not more than saying that 
the same is true of luck.
III
It might seem that there must be some fairly straightforward relation 
between actions and abilities. Perhaps, more to the point, we need a relation 
between action kinds and general abilities. But things here are a little more 
complicated, especially in the case of embodied abilities. These are fallible: 
one can have the ability to do something but try to do it and fail.
What is the link between abilities and success, or failure in attempts to 
achieve what I have called the internal aim of the action? In a famous passage, 
J.L. Austin suggests that an agent may have the ability and opportunity to φ, 
and try to φ, and yet fail to φ.
Consider the case where I miss a very short putt and kick myself because I could 
have holed it. It is not that I should have holed it if I had tried: I did try, and 
missed. It is not that I should have holed it if conditions had been different: that 
might of course be so, but I am talking about conditions as they precisely were, 
and asserting that I could have holed it. There is the rub . . . a human ability or 
power or capacity is inherently liable not to produce success, on occasion, and 
that for no reason (or are bad luck and bad form sometimes reasons?) (Austin, 
Urmson, and Warnock 1979, 166 n.1).
This reveals something important about the differences between embo-
died and non-embodied actions, and their modalities. Return to the Chess 
example. Chess is, paradigmatically, non-embodied. It can be multiply rea-
lised – played online, played by snail mail, played face to face on a board. 
Nothing of any importance hangs on the physical ability to move a chess 
piece. So nothing like the difficulty that Austin highlights can exist in non- 
embodied games: the specifically ‘human ability or power or capacity’ to carry 
out, successfully, an embodied action. Hence, pace Nguyen, nothing like the 
value of action can occur in non-embodied games. Perhaps, at this point, my 
argument will look trivial: Nguyen occludes the difference between embo-
died and non-embodied games. So what? Of course there are differences, but 
they are not important for agency. But I think this dismissal would be too 
quick. It misses out on some philosophically interesting features of embodied 
actions, and their relationship to abilities.
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Nguyen intends that his ‘aesthetics of agency’ account displaces an 
account in which certain sorts of games are thought of primarily as fiction. 
Nguyen wants to supersede this account with an account of Games as the Art 
of Agency, that applies more widely. But I want to take another look at that 
account and consider a different interpretation of the fiction/non-fiction 
divide, and a curious way in which that fresh approach might figure in the 
adjustment of our view of sport and games. This has implications for a 
practical-ethical question in contemporary sport. In doing so I draw on recent 
work by Derek Matravers and Kathleen Stock.
In Fiction and Narrative, Matravers continues his critical engagement with 
Kendall Walton’s Mimesis as Make Believe (Walton 1990) and suggests restruc-
turing the philosophy of fiction: ‘to shift the focus from the divide between 
non-fiction and fiction to focus on the divide between situations in which 
action (of a sort) is possible and situations in which action is not possible’ 
(Matravers 2014, 45).
Whether in line with Matravers’ intentions or not, I want to make a similar 
move in my critique of Nguyen, trading heavily on the parenthesised ‘of a 
sort’. Whilst it is obviously true that games permit actions – and this is what 
gets Nguyen’s account off the ground – not all games permit all kinds of 
actions. The distinction between sport and non-sport games concerns, at the 
minimum, the possibility of embodied actions, and (at least on my account, 
because of the ‘particular realisability’ claim made above) particular sorts of 
embodied actions. So the possibilities of embodied action are in play in sport, 
but not in non-embodied games. Matravers goes on to explicate his distinc-
tion as one between confrontations and representations. Confrontations, he 
says, are ‘situations in which action is possible and representations are situa-
tions in which action is not possible, because what is being represented to us 
is out of reach.’ His example is of the continuum between an actual con-
frontation with a wolf and a story about a wolf. For Matravers, the non-fiction 
to fiction move is quite minor: ‘having bored the family with the history of the 
time the wolf got into grandfather’s cave, it strikes me that, as the point is to 
pass the long winter evenings, I need not be constrained by the truth’. 
(Matravers 2014, 47) Confrontations, as Matravers puts it, do not require the 
imagination: rather his account of the distinction between fiction might be 
thought of as a ‘modality of action’ account: the key distinction is between 
situations in which a certain sort of action is possible and situations in which it 
is not.
Much the same, I think, is true of the difficulty involved in embodied sport. 
When halfway up a cliff face, there is no imagination required. A particular 
sort of action is both possible and necessary. In all these cases, the sports 
person is confronted by a web of affordances which invites and sometimes 
mandates embodied action. So these meet the criteria of Matravers’ 
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confrontation: action is possible: the agent is confronted by difficult doables 
in the world. (I argue elsewhere that these doables are what constitute sport.) 
That is not true of non-embodied games.
But, again, does this matter? I think it does help us fully to understand 
some questions about the nature of sport and games, and here I turn to a 
vexed question and a vexatious debate in contemporary sport: the question 
of the inclusion of trans women in female sport, and one particular aspect of 
that debate. There are, very roughly, two main arguments for trans inclusion 
into the female category. The first is empirical. This is the claim that treatment 
with cross-sex hormones, over time, removes male physiological advantages. 
I set this aside as an empirical claim, though it is increasingly undermined 
(Hilton and Lundberg 2020; Harper et al. 2021). The second approach, though, 
is non-empirical and rests on the assertion that ‘Trans women are women and 
it is fair for them to compete in women’s sport’ – a claim that is importantly 
non-empirical, makes no reference to bodies, or testosterone levels, or muscle 
mass etc. (Ivy and Conrad 2018).
In her discussion of these matters in Material Girls (Stock 2021) 
describes such a non-empirical move as involving ‘immersion in a fiction’ 
– ‘the fiction that they themselves, or others around them, have literally 
changed sex’ (Stock 2021, 187). Of course, there is nothing essentially 
problematic about being immersed in a fiction, and as Nguyen would 
obviously point out, it offers opportunities to experience the aesthetics of 
agency. In a study cited by Stock, ‘Games provide children with oppor-
tunities to experiment with different identities . . . Children can choose 
whether to play as males or as females, and can take on alternative social 
roles, including leadership and teaching roles’. Here they are able to 
‘experience abilities and satisfactions that are difficult to access in every-
day life’ (Przybylski et al. 2012, 69–76). Difficult or – since we cannot 
change sex – impossible. So the actions of competing-as-female-bodied 
in sport are impossible for transwomen, whereas the non-embodied 
actions of competing in a role-playing game online as female – with a 
female avatar – are not. So rather than agency being fluid across the 
terrain outlined by Nguyen, agency is particularly constrained in sport. 
This is, of course, why trans inclusion in categories according to gender 
identification in sport is a huge and controversial debate in political life, 
in the philosophy of sport, and applied ethics, the subject of many 
research studies, and a charged question for regulation by the IOC. The 
point here is not to argue for one or the other view of this controversy in 
the understanding and regulation of sport. It is only to point out what 
almost all accept: that there is a tricky ethical issue here. The issue is 
simply not posed in online RPGs because the modality of agency is 
different in each case.
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IV
So, to recap, I have tried to spell out some of the importance of the embodied 
actions that are constitutive of sport: the sort of knowledge that they evince, 
and the sort of value that they can give rise to. I have endorsed, in a limited 
way, Matravers’ restructuring account of the fiction/nonfiction divide as a 
distinction between Confrontation and Representation cashed out in terms of 
the possibilities of action. I have qualified this by placing further emphasis on 
the kinds of action involved – that the action I’m interested in is embodied 
action, because I’m interested in sport. I have borrowed Stock’s account of the 
immersion in fiction involved in trans identities and moved that into the 
Matravers account, concerning the possibility of particular sorts of actions. In 
this way, we return to the question of the modality of agency. This enables us 
to distinguish between embodied actions that are possible in confrontations 
with doables, and actions that can only be represented. This helps to show us 
that the sort of agency involved in embodied and non-embodied games is 
categorically different, that bodily constraints on agency are a sine qua non of 
sport, and that this fact has normative consequences for sport.
I set out to argue that Nguyen’s account of embodied and non-embodied 
games as constituting the ‘art of agency’ is too general: it aims to cover too 
much and misses out morally relevant distinctions between embodied and 
non-embodied games. The differences are important, and internally impor-
tant for his account. They involve the type of agency that is in play. For all its 
richness, Nguyen’s account occludes some of the philosophically interesting 
and normatively relevant distinctions between different modes of agency.
Note
1. The original is at https://peasoup.princeton.edu/2020/07/book-forum-c-thi- 
nguyen-games-agency-as-art/
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
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